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Abstract 
In this paper, the development of Dutch airports during the antebellum period from 
military airfields to mixed-airfields and finally to municipal airports is examined from 
an institutionalist- historical approach. Specific attention is given to the evolution of 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol within a regional socio-economic context and within a 
national context of local competition, particularly between the big cities in Randstad 
Holland. This paper argues that the rise and development of Schiphol and its impact 
on the surrounding urban area (city and the region) can be characterized as a co-
evolutionary process involving different actors within various domains – economic, 
political and institutional – and at different spatial levels. Airport development, 
therefore, has to be conceived as the result of a collective arrangement which has 
determined the spatial and economic development of the airport itself and the 
surrounding area.  
Keywords:  collective arrangements, institutions, municipal airports, Schiphol 
Airport. 
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Introduction 
Saturday, 2nd July 1938 thousands of people gathered at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol 
to demonstrate against the national government’s plans for the establishment of a new, 
national airport somewhere near the city of The Hague. The Ministry of Waterworks 
in cooperation with the National Aviation Board and KLM, the Royal Dutch airline 
company, was determined to construct a new, modern airport at a central location in 
Randstad Holland (the metropolitan area formed by the four big cities of Amsterdam, 
The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht), which would replace – or at least marginalize – 
the existing airports near Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Schiphol and Waalhaven. If this 
plan was to be carried out, Schiphol would indefinitely lose its status as the Dutch 
main airport – a status which it had managed to establish over the past two decades of 
its existence. According to one of the initiators of the protest meeting the citizens of 
Amsterdam were keen to proof that ‘they loved Schiphol and considered the airport to 
be an integral part of their beloved city and could not accept the amputation of such 
an important part of Amsterdam life’.1 Speeches were made by representatives from 
municipal government, the chamber of commerce and local businessmen, stressing 
the importance of Schiphol for Amsterdam to maintain its status as a centre of traffic, 
commerce and industry. Moreover, the proximity of the airport to the economic 
capital of the country was explicitly mentioned as a prerequisite for airport 
development. In turn, the presence of the airport near Amsterdam was considered as 
crucial for the future economic development of the city: Schiphol needed Amsterdam 
as much as Amsterdam needed Schiphol. Hence, the construction of a new airport 
many miles away from the Amsterdam region was an example of a complete lack of 
understanding regarding airport development – at least according to those gathered at 
Schiphol.2 Finally, members of the Amsterdam city council were embittered by the 
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fact that the national government only started to show interest in airport development 
at a time when Schiphol finally had developed into one of the best equipped European 
airports after many years of financial investments by the municipal government. 
Eventually, as will be explained later on, Amsterdam managed to turn the tide in its 
favour: instead of constructing a new airport, after the Second World War national 
government would decide to officially reestablish Schiphol as the ‘Dutch National 
Airport’.3 
 The nature and background of the demonstration at Schiphol airport raises a 
couple of intriguing and relevant questions with regard to the early history of Dutch 
airport development. In the Netherlands airport development apparently involved 
actors at different spatial levels, for instance representatives of both the national and 
the local government, and within different domains: government, business and civil 
society. This article aims to explain this notable political and social involvement in 
Dutch airport development throughout the first decades of its existence through a 
focus on the interaction between the main actors and the key political, social and 
economic factors which have determined the early history of Schiphol and other 
Dutch airports. We will particularly explore the institutional and economic relations 
between the airport and the city of Amsterdam as well as the relations between 
Schiphol and rival Dutch airports which competed with Schiphol in the early stages of 
Dutch airport development for the status of ‘national airport’. 
Despite the wave of studies on airport development in Europe and the USA 
which have been published over the past two decades, research focusing on the wider 
implications and interdependency of airport and urban development has been scarce. 
Most studies deal with specific topics such as airport design, architecture and 
engineering, infrastructure, the early history of single airports, or the remarkable feats 
 4 
of aviation pioneers, like Brodherson’s research on the construction and design of 
airport facilities and installations in the early days of the development of airports, 
Douglas’ study on the evolution of technology and the increased complexity of 
airports, Myerscough’s excellent survey of the provision of British aerodromes and 
airports during the inter-war years and Dierikx and Bouwens’ extensive monograph 
on the history of the Airport Schiphol in the European context which also primarily 
focuses on airport architecture and design.4 Moreover, the 1990s witnessed a plethora 
of case studies of individual airports in the USA.5 
These studies, nonetheless, have touched upon very relevant issues with regard 
to airport history. Bednarek for instance has posed one of the key questions which 
also applies to our investigation: how and why were airports at first run by municipal 
authorities? According to Bednarek this was predominantly a financial issue; federal 
institutions which were to benefit from airport development, but lacked the money to 
actively support it, like the US Post Office, looked to municipal governments or other 
local (business) interest groups for support. Fueled by local boosterism – aimed at 
improving the local economy – and civic pride many cities took up the challenge.6 
Although Bednarek’s analysis cannot simply be applied to our case – for instance 
because of huge differences in the financial relations between cities and the national 
government in the Netherlands and the US – her study has signaled the need to 
approach the early history of airport development from various perspectives. After all, 
apart from important economic and infrastructural functions airports also possess 
important cultural and institutional aspects such as image, perception and collective 
governance, which involves various actors at different spatial levels – local, regional, 
national and international – and in different institutional settings in state and society 
like public authorities, businessmen, technicians.7 
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For our analysis of the interplay between the various actors involved in airport 
development the concept of collective arrangements will be used. Collective 
arrangement is a key concept in institutional economics, an economic discipline 
which comprises a wide range of approaches highlighting the important role of 
institutions and institutional structure in the economy and society.8 We define a 
collective arrangement as a set of rules, norms, values and public policies taking place 
in an institutional setting. A collective arrangement results from negotiated, accepted 
and respected agreements, conventions and rules constraining or structuring the 
behaviour and interactions between different actors. Collective arrangements are 
bound in time and space in the sense that they are created in a specific historical 
context and in specific places.9 Applied to our investigation of the early history of 
Schiphol a ‘collective arrangement’ is seen as the result of a combination of policy, 
agreements, governance structure, and economic support (investments) aimed at the 
creation, improvement and transformation of the airport’s economic and spatial 
structure in relation to its wider urban or regional environment. The demonstration at 
Schiphol airport for instance was part of the emergence of a new collective 
arrangement, which eventually led to the establishment of Schiphol as a national 
airport after the Second World War, which would replace the existing collective 
arrangement regarding Schiphol as a municipal airport. Different actors at the local, 
regional, and national level were involved in determining the contours of this new 
collective arrangement which could only be formally established after long 
negotiations, discussions and research. In the next section we will identify those 
actors and explore the emergence and transformation of the collective arrangements 
which have directed the development of Schiphol and its wider region from 1916 
onwards. Apart from their formal nature, collective arrangements, however, also 
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exude certain collective representations and perceptions with regard to airport and 
urban development, like visions of the future of airports and aviation, as manifested in 
spatial planning concepts and designs.10 Those issues will be discussed in the second 
section when we elaborate on the Dutch ‘airport-battle’: the competition between the 
municipal airports in Amsterdam and Rotterdam and the debate about the 
establishment of a new national airport as mentioned in the start of our introduction. 
Collective arrangements and the early history of Schiphol 
The collective arrangement which has formed the basis for the creation of Schiphol in 
1916 was the Dutch Ministry of War’s decision to construct a military airfield in the 
Haarlemmermeer polder, an agrarian municipality to the southwest of Amsterdam 
(see map 1 bellow showing the location of Schiphol and Amsterdam). Schiphol was 
one of several small military airfields across the country, but the only military airfield 
within the Fortress Holland (in Dutch: Vesting Holland) which formed the key 
element of the Dutch defensive strategy. The Schiphol military airfield was located in 
the northeastern part of the Haarlemmermeer. As soon as Schiphol airfield became 
operational, it turned out to be too small for landing military aircraft; especially in 
crosswind. The following years Schiphol was expanded by the military authorities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1. The location of Schiphol airport within the Amsterdam-Schiphol region 
 7 
 
 
Throughout the 1920s the development of Schiphol was guided by a relatively 
clear and simple collective arrangement. By this we mean that the number of actors 
and persons involved was limited and most of them knew each other. Apart from the 
Ministries of War and Public Works a few other actors were involved in the 
development of Schiphol, particularly the city of Amsterdam, Dutch airline company 
KLM and to a lesser extent Fokker, the leading Dutch aircraft manufacturer. 
Amsterdam had started to show increasing interest in the airbase after a successful 
aviation exhibition which was organized in 1919: the First International Air traffic 
Exhibition Amsterdam (hereafter: ELTA). Many aviation enthusiasts were involved in 
the organization of this event ranging from people belonging to the Amsterdam 
financial sector such as Eddy Fuld, a prominent Amsterdam banker and a future 
Municipal Airport 
Schiphol (ca. 1927) 
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member of the supervisory board of KLM, representatives of the Dutch military and 
members of the city council of Amsterdam. During six weeks more than 500.000 
people visited the ELTA exhibition and admired the impressive Handley Page 
Bomber, the Vickers Vimy Bomber and Dutch airplanes manufactured by Fokker, 
Trompenburg and Van Berkel. After the exhibition the ELTA buildings were put into 
use by Anthony Fokker’s aircraft manufacturing company. Building on the successful 
organization of the ELTA, a group of prominent persons from the business world 
(financiers, bankers and businessmen) decided to join force to create a Dutch airline 
company: KLM, headed by Albert Plesman.11 KLM immediately asked permission to 
use Schiphol for commercial activities after signing an agreement with the post office 
in  March 1920 for transporting airmail between the cities of Amsterdam and London. 
In May 1920, the first commercial aircraft landed at Schiphol military airfield and in 
in June 1920, the military airfield Schiphol was officially declared open to 
commercial traffic, albeit partly and with a maximum of 30 flights per month. 
Schiphol nonetheless quickly developed into an important airport in the emerging 
European network of air services as KLM increased its operations and opened new 
line services such as those to Hamburg and Copenhagen which started in September 
1920.12 
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Map 2. Military airfield Schiphol (1919 – 1926)  
 
 
Source: A. El-Makhloufi (2009). Own compilation based on various historical maps 
and maps of the airport Schiphol between 1919 and 1939 (spatial plans and 
expansion plans, etc.) projected on Historical map of North Holland, known as 
‘Bonne historical maps’, dated from 1936 
 
With opening access to civil aviation the initial collective arrangement 
regarding Schiphol as a military airfield was replaced by a new, more complex 
arrangement which transformed Schiphol into a mixed airfield. In fact Schiphol was 
now governed by two State Ministries – War and Public Works which was 
responsible for civil aviation operations – but primarily operated by personnel of the 
Ministry of War.13 Other key actors within this collective arrangement were KLM-
director Albert Plesman and Dutch airplane constructor and aviator Antony Fokker. 
Both, as we will see, more or less had their own vision on the development of 
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Schiphol, but each of them played an essential role in the early development the 
airport. The relationship between Plesman and Fokker was as much characterized by 
cooperation as by a series of conflicts. Both were visionary and pragmatic persons 
with great passion for the civil aviation in general and fervent proponents of the 
development of Dutch civil aviation in particular. A large part of the KLM fleet 
consisted of Fokker aircraft; in fact the early development of KLM and Fokker was 
closely intertwined.14 The relationship between these two companies and their 
relationship with Schiphol was of great importance for the development of 
commercial aviation in the Netherlands: Fokker furnished new airplanes to KLM and 
the performances of KLM helped to promote the Fokker airplanes. Plesman, however, 
was first and foremost a businessman with a commercial mentality which surpassed 
nationalistic feelings. When Douglas started to produce its famous DC series in the 
1930s Plesman did not hesitate to switch Fokker for American produce.15  
In the early 1920s, with the increase of the scope and size of services provided 
by the military for an ever growing number of civil aircraft and the rising costs of 
airfield services – like the lighting of the landing ground, fire control, medical 
services and passport checks – the coexistence of two different air activities at the 
same airfield was questioned by the military authorities. Moreover, the military lacked 
the financial means to make necessary improvements to airport infrastructure. 
Schiphol lacked, among other things, terminal buildings, hangars and passengers 
check-in desks. Moreover, Schiphol was not properly connected with Amsterdam by 
road or train; the only transport system connecting Schiphol and Amsterdam was a 
KLM bus service. People travelling by car were forced to pass through two toll 
bridges and cross a narrow bridge over the Rijnvaart canal encircling the 
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Haarlemmermeerpolder before reaching the airport. The 11,5 kilometers from 
Amsterdam to Schiphol took over thirty minutes or more.16 
Both the Ministry of War and KLM pinned their hopes on the Amsterdam 
government to improve the conditions at Schiphol. They were supported by the 
Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce which considered the development of Schiphol to 
be one of the main contributors to the future economic development of the city. The 
airport was expected to act as a magnet for attracting firms and activities to 
Amsterdam. Moreover, the Amsterdam business elite, which were financially 
involved in KLM and Fokker, wanted to secure its investments. The municipality, 
however, appeared to lack the expertise, political power and financial means to 
effectively operate and manage an airport. Despite the fact that almost none of the 
European and American airports and airlines at the time were able to gain profit, 
Amsterdam municipal government was, nonetheless, keen to take over Schiphol and 
invest in its future development. In 1926 the Amsterdam city council almost 
unanimously decided to take over Schiphol.17 Amsterdam got the right to manage and 
exploit the municipal airport for a period of 10 years with an option for another thirty 
years. Following this agreement, the airport was split in two: a military and a 
municipal part. In 1935 Amsterdam agreed to take over the military part as well.18 
The fact that the Amsterdam government had been willing to take the financial 
risk and decided to take over Schiphol had everything to do with the emergence of a 
number of key local actors who were determined to improve the economic position of 
their city nationally and internationally.19 Key figures and institutions within the new 
collective arrangement were Schiphol-director Jan Dellaert, members of the 
Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce, Amsterdam mayor Willem de Vlugt and various 
municipal departments. Like Plesman Dellaert had started his career as a pilot; both 
 12 
had attended the military school at Soesterberg airfield near Utrecht. When KLM 
settled at Schiphol in the early 1920s Plesman asked Dellaert to act as chief of the 
station building. He was a man with great knowledge of aviation and a very 
competent manager. When the municipality of Amsterdam took over the airport from 
the military in 1926, Dellaert would be appointed as the first director of the municipal 
airport. Thanks to his personal relationship with Plesman, he was able to defend the 
interests of the municipal airport as well as the interest of the main user of airport 
facilities: KLM. Moreover Dellaert was aware of the fact that the future of KLM and 
Schiphol was closely intertwined. Dellaert made sure Amsterdam kept investing in 
airport facilities in order to commit KLM to Schiphol.20 
The chamber of commerce consisted of local representatives of trade and 
business who were dedicated to the protection and promotion of business interests and 
who often also belonged to the city’s social elite and were therefore ensured of access 
to the worlds of government and finance. Ernst Heldring, chairman of the Amsterdam 
chamber of commerce in the 1920s was a prominent member of the liberal party, born 
into a wealthy, upper class family and famous for his numerous additional activities in 
social and cultural life.21 Like their colleagues in The Hague and Rotterdam, the 
Amsterdam chamber showed great interest in the development of aviation and pressed 
for local governmental intervention in municipal airport development.22  
Within Amsterdam local government mayor De Vlugt in particular was 
occupied with connecting the world of politics and business in order to boost the 
city’s economy, using his contacts at different levels of government and his ties with 
Dutch businessmen. De Vlugt for instance exerted himself to reach an agreement with 
the national government on the construction of a new connection of the Amsterdam 
harbour with the Rhine and was involved in bringing the 1928 Olympic Games to his 
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city.23 The fact that he was able to do so had everything to do with the political 
willingness of Amsterdam councillors and aldermen to invest in their city’s 
(economic) future.24 
From 1926 onwards the development of Schiphol airport would be coordinated 
by the municipal Department of Commerce, which was responsible for the 
management of the airport – carried out by Dellaert – and the Department of Public 
Works, which drafted plans for the future expansion and improvement of the airport. 
Within the Amsterdam municipal planning department the development of Schiphol 
airport was treated as a key issue with regard to the overall economic development of 
Amsterdam and its region. The spatial sprawl of the Amsterdam Region increased 
rapidly during the 1920s and 30s with the annexation of a number of surrounding 
municipalities. The ongoing development of airplane technologies and the 
corresponding increase of commercial aviation also resulted in the gradual spatial 
expansion of airport facilities and equipments, which in turn called for a more 
systematic approach to the development of the airport in the future and its relation to 
the nearby Amsterdam urban area.  
The airport expansion plan for Schiphol was developed in 1935 by the urban 
planners and urban designers of the city of Amsterdam in cooperation with the airport 
authorities, the municipality of Haarlemmermeer and the province of North-Holland. 
The plan not only consisted of the development of the airport itself, but also dealt with 
issues like housing construction for the employees of Schiphol and the KLM in the 
surrounding municipalities, the total surface of land to be expropriated from private 
owners, and the spatial organization of airport facilities.25 Moreover, the Schiphol 
Expansion Plan was integrated into the urban expansion plan of the municipality of 
Haarlemmermeer as a first step to coordinate the expansion of the airport and the 
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surrounding area. In this sense, the future expansion plans for Schiphol constituted an 
integral part of the overall urban expansion plans of the city of Amsterdam and the 
municipality of Haarlemmermeer, which clearly indicates the importance of Schiphol 
as one of the main economic engines, in terms of employment and (freight) transport, 
for Amsterdam and the region. Barrett’s analysis of airport development in the United 
States which was not conceived at the drawing board, but resulted from the interaction 
between ‘the leaders of corporations and chambers of commerce along with 
politicians, city engineers, and federal bureaucrats whose decisions determined the 
relationship between the airport and the city’, therefore does not entirely hold true for 
Schiphol: plans were made at the drawing board and played a part in the discussions 
about airport and urban development.26 
 
Improvements of the airfield and facilities at Schiphol were carried out shortly 
after Amsterdam had taken over responsibility over the airport. The terrain was 
renewed and leveled, an underground drainage system was constructed and a big 
white circle was put at the middle of the landing terrain in order to serve as a clearly 
visible landmark for landing aircraft. In addition, a large concrete apron was 
constructed at the front of the KLM hangar, office space was extended and the airport 
was equipped with a terminal building, paved runways, hangars, radio-installation, 
lighted beacons and a control tower. Road access to the airport was also improved. 
Municipal authorities managed to convince the national and provincial government of 
the need to integrate Schiphol in the national and provincial road network.27 Within 
the course of two decades the rather primitive Schiphol airfield developed into a 
modern European airport (see Map 3 bellow which shows the situation in 1939 after 
the expansions of Schiphol). 
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Map 3. The Spatial Expansion of Schiphol from 1926–1939  
 
 
Source: A. El-Makhloufi (2009). The map shows the situation of the Schiphol Airport 
in 1939 
 
The improvements at Schiphol were inspired by foreign ideas and experiences. 
From the second half of the 1920s an international network emerged which generated 
cooperation among airport operators and facilitated the exchange of experiences, ideas 
and (technical) information. This usually happened through regular meetings of 
European airport operators, but also through correspondence, conferences, and 
publications in professional magazines. Two main technical issues at Schiphol for 
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instance were solved partly by copying practices from other airports, especially in the 
US: the drainage system and the construction of paved runways.28 Compared to 
foreign airfields like Le Bourget near Paris, Croydon in London or Tempelhof in 
Berlin, these improvements were, however, much less impressive and very modest in 
size, design and scope, due to the lack of municipal financial means. It is, however, 
difficult to compare different airfields across Europe, because of great differentiation 
between airports in terms of their construction, design, management and 
exploitation.29 While Tempelhof airport and, to a leser extent, Le Bourget benefited 
from state financial support, Croydon and many other local airports in the UK – like 
Schiphol – were financially supported by less affluent local governments. As was the 
case for many European airports, Schiphol registered a continuous financial deficit 
and the total costs of operating and expanding the airport facilities pushed Amsterdam 
to seek funds in the financial market, which in turn resulted in high interest payments. 
This explains why Schiphol was much less impressive in terms of design, size and 
equipment than Le Bourget and Tempelhof. 
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Figure 1. Annual Costs, Net Result & Municipal Subsidies.  
 
Source, Annual: Reports Municipal Airport Schiphol (1928-1940)] 
 
Eventually, towards the end of the 1930s airport authorities, in this case 
municipal authorities, turned to the national government for financial support. Due to 
the economic crisis of the 1930s, the increasing costs and complexity of airport 
expansion and construction, and the Amsterdam municipal government’s chronic lack 
of funds, public intervention became urgent and financial support from the state was 
seen as prerequisite to insure the survival of the airport in general and national civil 
aviation in particular. This did not only apply to Schiphol but also to the majority of 
other European airports which were operated by local authorities or private airport 
operators.30 The Dutch national government in turn aimed to strategically invest their 
money in an airport which appeared fit to face the challenges of the future, rapid 
development of aviation. This meant that a choice had to be made between Schiphol 
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and its main competitor Waalhaven, but the national government also studied the 
possibility of constructing a new national, ‘central’ airport in Randstad Holland. In 
Amsterdam those plans, as mentioned in the introduction, were met with fierce 
prostests.  This debate about the future of Dutch aviation, and the local boosterism 
and competition which accompanied it, will be discussed in the next section in order 
to explore the growing complexity of the different collective arrangements which 
have characterized the early history of Dutch aviation. 
  
The Dutch airport battle 
In the 1920s and 30s several plans were presented for either the expansion of existing 
airports or the construction of new ones near Rotterdam, the Hague and Amsterdam or 
in between these cities, in an area better known as Randstad Holland. The Dutch 
‘airport battle’ was driven to a great extent by the involvement of the chambers of 
commerce and the municipal government of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. 
Local boosterism, efforts to diversify the city’s economic structure and the urge to 
‘think modern’ turned airport development into an important element of metropolitan 
politics. In Amsterdam local boosterism was particularly produced by mayor De 
Vlugt and the city’s Chamber of Commerce which can be best understood against the 
background of Amsterdam’s recent economic history. 
In the nineteenth century Amsterdam had forever – or so it seemed – lost its 
status as one of Europe’s major economic centers. Already in the eighteenth century 
the city had lost much of its economic vitality. While England had built up an entirely 
new type of industrial production based on steam and coal, the industries of the 
Amsterdam-Zaan region still mostly relied on wind and water power. It took until the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century for this to change. A new, progressive political 
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culture ended the erstwhile dominant laissez-faire policy of the local governors. 
Moreover, a new commercial and industrial elite, profiting from extensive 
exploitation of the Dutch East Indies, was willing to invest in their city’s future. The 
local government together with the national government started to invest in the city’s 
infrastructure: 1876 marked the opening of the North Sea Channel, which connected 
the Amsterdam harbour to the North Sea near the city of IJmuiden. The following 
decades Amsterdam invested in the construction of a new waterway connecting the 
harbour with the Rhine, thus ensuring a connection with the economically very 
important German hinterland.31 Despite these investments, Amsterdam entered the 
twentieth century predominantly as a cultural and financial center. Thanks to its better 
connections with the sea and Germany, Rotterdam emerged as the Dutch main port 
and the industrial capital of the Netherlands. The Amsterdam economy, on the other 
hand, was dominated by the transportation, commercial and financial sectors.32 Urban 
government, nonetheless, was still ambitious enough to try and compete with 
Rotterdam.  
Since airports were seen as complementary to the harbor activities, both cities 
were willing to invest in the development of an airfield. When Rotterdam established 
a municipal airport in 1921, airport Waalhaven, Amsterdam was determined to follow 
suit. In fact airport development in both cities was closely associated with the urban 
governments’ efforts to maintain their city’s economic position vis-à-vis each other.33 
Rotterdam airport Waalhaven boasted a modern infrastructure, whereas the more 
primitive Schiphol airport offered better possibilities for future expansion. In 
Rotterdam the city council decided to offer interesting cost advantages – for instance 
reduced landing fees – and subsidies to airline companies which used the facilities of 
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the airport. The Amsterdam city council in turn urged for the expansion of the existing 
airport.  
In this sense the urban governors’ response to the development of civil 
aviation in general and Schiphol and Waalhaven airport in particular reflected what 
has been called ‘traditional local boosterism’ and its superlative degree: ‘the winged 
gospel’. Urban government was keen ‘to promote the growth and development of 
[their] city, [which] often included a sense of competition with rival cities. Airports 
and aviation in general played a significant role in these efforts to boost the image of 
‘modernity’. The Dutch took pride in the achievements of KLM and Fokker as is 
illustrated by the celebrations surrounding air races and the media coverage of 
pioneering flights.34 As illustrated by Bednarek some aviation enthusiasts went far 
beyond local boosterism to promote the miracle of aviation – the ‘winged gospel’ – 
unconstrained by economic or political considerations.35 Furthermore, there was a 
widely shared believe in the future opportunities of air transportation in linking 
countries and continents, which was marked by Charles Lindbergh’s pioneering 
transatlantic flight in 1927. The same year KLM carried out two successful return 
flights to Batavia, the capital city of the Dutch East Indies, which aroused 
considerable public enthusiasm.36 Moreover, the annual reports of Schiphol and KLM 
during the inter-war years show a continuous increase in the number of passengers, 
freight and post transport (see figure. 2 bellow). 
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Figure 2. Development of passengers, freight and post transport by KLM or through 
Schiphol. 
 
 
Source: Annual reports of Municipal Airport Schiphol and KLM (1920-1940) 
 
In Rotterdam airport development had been initiated by the municipal 
authorities. In 1919 mayor Zimmerman urged his commissioners to actively promote 
aviation in their city. A year later Zimmerman paid a visit to Schiphol in preparation 
for the construction of an airport near the city of Rotterdam. As opposed to 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam opted for a location in the dock area, based on the belief in the 
importance of seaplanes.37 This would soon turn out to be an unlucky decision. The 
Waalhaven location did not offer any possibilities for further expansion. Moreover, 
the airport was located on the south bank of the river Maas and therefore was not easy 
to reach from Rotterdam city center nor from the city of The Hague.38 Instead of 
investing in the construction of a new airport, municipal authorities in Rotterdam, 
nonetheless, kept investing in the modernization of Waalhaven, even when 
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negotiations with The Hague about the establishment of a new airport were well under 
way.39  
The Hague, the political and administrative center of the Netherlands, lacked a 
civilian airport. In 1924 the city’s chamber of commerce presented a report to the city 
council, arguing for the construction of a new airport near the city. The mayor of The 
Hague, however, was rather pessimistic. According to mayor Patijn it would at least 
take twenty years before The Hague could be equipped with its own airport; it was not 
the dynamic urban policy making the Chamber of Commerce was hoping for.40 
Eventually, after continuing pressure from local businessmen, the municipal 
government did decide to explore the opportunities for a municipal airport adopting 
several strategies. First of all, The Hague explored possibilities to establish a 
municipal airport in or near the city. Second, municipal authorities tried to convince 
their Rotterdam colleagues to cooperate and develop a joint airport in between both 
cities. Third, urban government supported plans for the construction of a new national 
airport in Randstad Holland which should replace the existing airports near Rotterdam 
and Amsterdam. For financial reasons, The Hague urban governors initially opted for 
cooperation with nearby Rotterdam. When they approached their Rotterdam 
colleagues to discuss the establishment of a joint airport in between both cities, 
Rotterdam wanted to be financially compensated for their investments in Waalhaven. 
At first the urban government of The Hague agreed and plans were made for a new 
airport in a polder to the Northwest of Rotterdam, near the highway which connected 
the city to Delft and The Hague: plan-Delft. Waalhaven was to be sold to the Ministry 
of War.41 Eventually, however, The Hague again backed out. Mayor Bosch van 
Rosenthal, who succeeded Patijn in 1930, when the world economic crisis first 
emerged in the Netherlands, was not prepared to invest in airport development.  
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Meanwhile, Rotterdam kept investing in its Waalhaven airport in order to keep 
up with Schiphol, which further jeopardized the plans for the construction of a new 
airport near Delft. Waalhaven, however, was soon stretched to its limits; eventually 
local government acknowledged that in order to keep up with Schiphol a new airport 
had to be established. The Ministry of War was prepared to buy Waalhaven to acquire 
a military airfield at a strategic position in the Dutch defense system. Rotterdam 
wanted to use the money to construct of a new municipal airport to the northwest of 
the city near the motorway to Delft and The Hague: plan-Zestienhoven.42 
Amsterdam looked at the Rotterdam plans with Argus’ eyes and was 
determined to meet the challenge. Several plans were made in order to upgrade and 
modernize Schiphol airport. In 1934 Plesman launched his plan for the construction of 
a new airport in the Haarlemmermeer just north of the existing Schiphol airport. In 
order to improve the access to Schiphol, Plesman urged for the construction of a new 
terminal building near the new motorway between Amsterdam and The Hague. In 
reaction to Plesman’s plan, which appeared to be too expensive for the city’s tight 
financial budget, Amsterdam authorities presented an alternative which amounted to 
the construction of a second terminal 200 meter west of the existing one, with 
concrete taxiways around the turf of the landing ground in order to improve take-off 
and landing. This plan was much cheaper than the Plesman plan. In the mean time, 
also Anthony Fokker was working on a plan for the future development of Schiphol 
airport. In his concept, the layout of the airport was based on a large circular landing 
terrain, with a central ‘traffic island’ in the middle where all passengers and cargo 
handling could take place. The central traffic island could be accessed through a 
tunnel to avoid any obstacles on the landing terrain. In this way an optimum 
operational use of the airport could be reached. The layout of the terminal could be 
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circular or ‘horse-shoe’ shaped, depending on the airport’s general layout.43 Also 
Fokker’s plan turned out to be too expensive and the city council instead opted for the 
expansion of existing facilities at Schiphol airport. At the height of the economic 
crisis, Schiphol was equipped with a new runway system, consisting of four runways, 
one in concrete – and an enlarged terminal building and control tower. Schiphol had 
become one of Europe’s largest airports in terms of its surface.44 
Simultaneously, however, the national government was working on a plan to 
build a new airport near Leiderdorp, a village to the northeast of The Hague, near the 
city of Leiden. This plan not only affected the position of Schiphol, which would lose 
its status as the main airport of the Netherlands, but also jeopardized plan-
Zestienhoven. According to the national government the rapid development of 
aviation called for a national approach to the airport-question. Since a small country 
like the Netherlands could only afford one, modern-equipped national airport, 
investments in aviation had to be controlled by the national government. From a 
planning perspective, Dutch airport development therefore required national 
coordination. Existing airports near Rotterdam and Amsterdam appeared to be 
improperly located: unfit to meet the rapid developments of aviation because of the 
composition of the soil or the lack of extension possibilities. The proponents of a 
systematic planning approach to airport development, arguing for a central location in 
Randstad Holland, however, ignored the interrelationship between airports and their 
urban surroudings; an interrelationship which had enabled the rapid development of 
Schiphol and Waalhaven, but which was entirely absent from most airport and urban 
planning schemes. This only adds to the uniqueness of the Amsterdam municipal 
planning department’s plans for the future development of the Amsterdam region, 
which showed the department’s awareness of the need to integrate the future 
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development of both airport and city. Most urban planning elsewhere, however, was 
merely aimed at resolving local problems such as housing shortage, transport 
congestion, employment and the attraction of economic activities. The systematic 
integration of infrastructure planning in urban expansion plans was limited or totally 
absent.45  
Also Plesman was not occupied with the regional impact of airport 
development. His views in this respect were driven by financial concerns and his 
dissatisfaction with developments at Schiphol, where spending cuts had hampered a 
complete reconstruction as envisaged by the KLM-director, when he instigated the 
effort to establish a new national airport in Randstad Holland: plan-Leiderdorp. This 
location, to the northeast of The Hague, was chosen for its central location in between 
The Hague, Rotterdam and Amsterdam, and its accessibility by road. Strikingly, the 
city which had been least inclined to invest in airport development was to be equipped 
with a modern airport in its immediate surroundings. Amsterdam and Rotterdam 
reacted furiously, but Amsterdam appeared to be most successful in generating public 
protest. A civilian committee by the name of ‘S.O.S. Schiphol’ was established, 
consisting of representatives of the Amsterdam business elite, political and social 
movements, and started to mobilise press support for the Schiphol-cause. As 
mentioned in the introduction, 15.000 people gathered at Schiphol airport in July 1938 
to demonstrate against plan-Leiderdorp. In this case planning discourse of course was 
unfit to press the cause of Schiphol: demonstrators referred to historical developments 
which had brought about the emergence of a modern airport near Amsterdam and the 
economic necessity of the airport for the urban economy to support their cause. The 
Amsterdam municipal government pressed the national government to designate 
Schiphol as the Dutch national airport.46 Rotterdam now feared it would loose out to 
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Amsterdam, despite the – rather tame – efforts of its chamber of commerce to press 
the case for airport development in or near Rotterdam. In fact, when the national 
government, confronted with fierce opposition, decided to abort plan-Leiderdorp in 
September 1938 and assign Schiphol the status of national airport, Rotterdam faced a 
new battle.47  
The national government’s rather inconsistent policy was met with fierce 
criticism and amounted to the establishment of the National Commission for the 
Settlement of the Airport Question.48 Meanwhile, the national government started 
negotiations with Amsterdam about the administrative reorganization of Schiphol 
airport which was to be turned into a public corporation in which both the national 
government and the municipality of Amsterdam would participate with the national 
government holding a majority interest of 60 percent. The establishment of a public 
corporation would enhance the possibility to finance the future development of the 
airport, since the municipal budget of Amsterdam was already stretched to – or even 
beyond – its limits. Discussions about the future of Schiphol continued well into the 
Second World War, despite the demolition of parts of the airport in May 1940 and the 
reestablishment of Schiphol as an operational base of the German Luftwaffe in July 
1940. Dellaert, Plesman and representatives of the national government went 
underground to discuss rather technical and theoretical issues with regard to the 
airport layout – tangential or parallel – lighting, radio installations, safety regulations 
and infrastructure.49 The actual circumstances may have contributed to the 
development of future plans for Schiphol unhampered by the pre-war conditions: in 
1943 and 1944 Schiphol was gradually destructed by allied bombings and German 
efforts to dismantle the airport on retreat. 
 
 27 
Conclusions 
Collective arrangements are dynamic: they are subject to transformation and change 
as is illustrated by the early history of Schiphol aiport. The basic collective 
arrangement which lay at the basis of Schiphol as a military airfield transformed into 
a mixed airport between 1919-1926 before becoming a municipal airport in 1926. The 
early history of Schiphol has also showed that a basic collective arrangement can be 
transformed without losing its constituting components – as is illustrated by the 
continuous involvement of KLM and members of State Departments, responsible for 
safety regulations at the airport. Furthermore, in the case of Schiphol the 
transformation of the collective arrangement resulted in growing complexity. From 
the 1950s, after the national government had finally decided to appoint Schiphol as 
the Dutch national airport for international aviation, the number of actors directly or 
indirectly involved in the development of the airport increased substantially. The 
following graphs show the organization of networks of actors involved in the 
development of the airport during the pre-war and the post-war period. The graphical 
representation of networks of actors clearly shows the increased complexity of 
vertical, in terms of local-regional and national governance levels, and horizontal, 
between local and regional actors, interrelations (see graph 1). 
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Graph 1. Networks of actors involved in the development of Schiphol Airport 
between 1919 and 1939  
 
 
Source: A. El Makhloufi (2009). The Thickness of the read line shows how strong the 
ties between local actors (for example between KLM and Schiphol). Blue line shows 
weak ties/relations between actors. 
 
The growing complexity mirrors the growing importance of Schiphol for the 
urban and regional economy. From the end of the 1960s onwards Schiphol turned into 
a real catalyst for the urban and regional economic development. This was part of a 
process of economic transformation in Amsterdam. After the war strong efforts to 
‘industrialize’ the Amsterdam urban economy, centering on the development of 
harbor-related (petro-)chemical industries, eventually failed. From the 1960s onwards 
this modern, industrialist municipal policy would be overtaken by events which 
resulted in the – sometimes harsh – realities of post-industrialism like the 
deindustrialization of employment and population decline; Amsterdam’s population 
fell from its peak of 869.000 inhabitants in 1960 to 676.000 in 1984.50 In the 
meantime, however, the importance of Schiphol for both the Amsterdam and the 
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national economy grew significantly. From the 1960s onwards, the economic (and 
spatial) effects of Schiphol seem to be regionally widespread but strong economic 
benefits have been limited to Amsterdam and the wider Schiphol region.51 As our 
study has shown, in the case of Schiphol the creation of the airport and airport 
services, as well as the development of civil aviation during the 1920s and 1930s did 
not yet act as an important boost for the economic development of the region. The 
early history of Schiphol is, therefore, not so much related to economic, but also to 
institutional developments. A number of factors have been important during the early 
decades of its existence. 
 First of all, the close cooperation and personal influence of key figures like 
KLM director Plesman, Schiphol director Dellaert, Fokker, and mayor de Vlugt seems 
to have been decisive for the success of the airport in its early years. Each had their 
own vision, ambition and objective, but they all played an essential role in 
determining the future of Schiphol. In fact together, these actors formed a coalition 
organized around conventions, agreements and rules, which to a great extent shaped 
the history of Schiphol during the interwar years. The Amsterdam urban government 
in particular was willing to take risks and invest in the development and the extension 
of their municipal airport, despite the economic crisis of the 1930s and despite the fact 
that Schiphol could not generate enough financial means to sustain its ambitious 
expansion plans.  
Second, the early development of Schiphol was guided by civic pride and local 
boosterism, urban competition, political considerations and great enthusiasm about 
civil aviation technology, airport infrastructure and the modernism and heroism which 
surrounded the early history of aviation. From an economic point of view, the airport 
Schiphol (and the KLM for that matter) may been an example of very inefficient 
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business. During the early years of the airport, economic rationality, however, seems 
not to have played a major role. From the second half of the 1920s, the Amsterdam 
urban government conveyed a strong sense of urgency, of the necessity to somehow 
grab the chance, provided by Schiphol, to make a significant leap in the development 
of their city. Schiphol played a significant role in local boosterism, as was illustrated 
by the use of the airport to market a ‘modern’ image of the city, and was used as an 
instrument to attract investments and boost the local economy. In 1928, when 
Amsterdam hosted the Olympic Games, Schiphol was used to market the city as a 
touristic, modern city and as the economic capital of the Netherlands.52 
Third, the development of Schiphol benefitted from the fact that the airport 
design was conceived in the very early stages of the existence of Schiphol and 
provided for an excellent framework for discussions on the future development of the 
civil aviation in the Netherlands as a whole and the future of the airport Schiphol with 
regard to the national economy in particular.53 These discussions were fed by formal 
and informal relationships between airport operators and professionals of civil 
aviation. Circulation of information about the technological development of aviation 
and airport construction requirements took place through direct (meetings, 
conferences, work-visits) or indirect contacts (correspondence, professional 
magazines) within and between different networks worldwide. Moreover, in 
Amsterdam the results of this cross-fertilization of knowledge spillovers was used to 
construct plans for the future development of the airport. From the early 1930s, 
Amsterdam integrated the planning of Schiphol into the Amsterdam Development 
Plan (AUP) and into the urban development plan of the Haarlemmermeer and set up a 
special municipal commission to study and prepare the expansion of Schiphol, which 
clearly showed the growing importance of the airport for the surrounding areas and 
 31 
the region as a whole.54 At a very early stage in the development of Schiphol and 
although  most of the airports at that time were operating at a loss, Amsterdam 
authorities had developed a clear vision on the future of their airport and appeared to 
be fully aware of the importance of airport development for the regional economic 
growth.  
Finally, this study has aimed to contribute to an ever growing number of 
studies on airport history by focusing on the initial stages of airport development. 
Studying the inter war period appears to offer us relevant insights in the process of 
creation and development of airports and, more importantly, helps us to understand 
which actors and factors have contributed to the formation of collective arrangements 
which, to a great extent, determined the creation and development path of airports and 
their relationship with the surrounding urban area. In order to get to grips with the 
present position and importance of airport development at the regional level, one 
should therefore study the causes and consequences of its emergence during the 
pioneering era. 
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